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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) on employment 
retention and advancement.  The WFTC, which replaced Family Credit in October 1999, 
supplemented earnings of low paid workers living in low income families.  It was designed to 
increase the financial incentive for low skilled workers to find and remain in work and in the 
process boost their family income.  It finds evidence that WFTC increased employment 
retention among male recipients.  WFTC does not appear to have increased wage growth 
compared with Family Credit but there is no evidence that employers were able to use the 
more generous WFTC to keep wage growth down. 
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1 Introduction 
The 1980s and early 1990s saw large increases in earnings and income inequality and 
the distribution of work across households. These factors contributed to large 
increases in child poverty, so that by 1997 about a third of all British children lived in 
relative poverty (Gregg, Harkness and Machin, 1999). The predominant reason for 
this was the absence of work in these families coupled with benefit levels which were 
insufficient to lift them out of poverty. Roughly one fifth of children lived in 
households with no adult in work and poverty rates among these households were 
very high. The reasons for this situation are disputed, for many, the gains from 
entering work were very low. Low skill levels often meant that the wage an individual 
would receive on entering work would be low. In addition, with the loss of benefits, 
many households would actually be worse off if they entered work, especially taking 
into account childcare costs. It was these disincentives to work that the Labour 
government sought to change with the introduction of Tax Credits and various other 
labour market policies.  
 
The underlying principle behind much of the Government’s welfare reform has been 
based on a ‘work-first model’. Here the assumption is that any job is better than no 
job at all. In contrast the ‘human capital model’ promotes education and training on 
the basis that this would provide a higher entry point to the labour market, improve 
job retention and progression. The emphasis on the work-first model reflected the 
direction of welfare reform in the US. In the US out of work individuals are left with 
very little choice other than to accept any available job, in the UK, up to a point, 
individuals have a greater degree of choice. Welfare reform designed to decrease the 
number of individuals out of work and claiming benefits has (a) tightened up out of 
work benefit entitlement, restricting the criteria for eligibility and duration entitlement 
[JobSeeker’s Allowance/New Deals] and (b) increased the financial incentive to take 
‘unattractive’ jobs [in work benefits/tax credits/NMW] otherwise known as ‘making 
work pay’. Understandably the incentive has been to move as many people off 
benefits as possible and while the work first approach may have the greatest short 
term gains, in the long term it may be counterproductive and financially inefficient. 
This would particularly be the case if it was found that individuals cycle through 
welfare programmes interspersed with low paid jobs supported through high rates of 
in-work benefits. There has also been some concern that whilst in the past there was a 
financial disincentive to find work, through the introduction of generous in-work 
benefits individuals may now have become trapped in low paying poor quality jobs as 
a result of financial disincentives to progress and move off in-work benefits. 
 
Over the last 20 years a number of policy changes have been made to in work benefits 
in the UK. The two most financially important in-work benefits are wage supplements 
and assistance with housing costs. In terms of impacting on the welfare to work 
transition perhaps the most significant have been the move from Family Income 
Supplement (which had been introduced in 1971) to Family Credit in 1988 and then 
the introduction of WFTC in 1999. These policy changes affected both eligibility 
rules (generally increasing the number of eligible low paid workers) and also the 
amount of benefit received for different working hours/wage combinations. This had 
fairly significant impacts on the work incentives for certain groups of individuals, 
which in turn appear to have impacted upon their employment rates. For example, 
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Gregg and Harkness (2003) find that the introduction of WFTC raised lone parent 
employment by 7 percentage points. Interaction with Housing Benefit remains 
important and for some groups results in very little initial gains from finding work. 
However, little research work has been done on the transition rates of individuals into 
work and their subsequent job retention and advancement. 
 
In this project we aim to get a better understanding of which factors make ladders out 
of benefit dependency sustainable in the long term. We know from existing research 
on low wage dynamics that for some individuals low paid jobs act as stepping stones 
to better paid jobs while others become trapped in either long periods in low pay or 
cycling between low pay and no pay. We are interested in extending this research to 
consider how in work benefits interact with low pay dynamics. We will examine how 
different groups of individuals fare with a focus on gender, age and cohort groups. 
Finally, we will analyse the impact of policy changes on progression. We shall 
concentrate on tax credits so before moving onto the analysis we provide some 
background on the system of tax credits in the UK and review the research evidence 
on the impact of tax credits on employment. 
 
2. Tax credits 
The Working Families Tax Credit was introduced in October 1999 and was phased in 
over a six month period. The WFTC was not a completely new innovation. Family 
Credit (FC), a system of in-work support, was already in place and the WFTC took on 
essentially the same design. However, WFTC was significantly more generous; 
spending on FC in 1998/99 was £2.4bn but this rose to £6.3bn in 2002/03 under 
WFTC. Furthermore the payment mechanism changed. FC was paid directly as a cash 
benefit to the primary carer but from 2000 WFTC was paid by the employer through 
the pay packet, with employers reimbursed by the Inland Revenue1. Only working 
families with dependent children were eligible to claim WFTC or FC.  
 
Eligibility for WFTC was dependent on hours of employment, the number of children, 
net income and capital of the family and childcare costs. To qualify, an adult in the 
family had to work at least 16 hours a week in paid employment. Families with a net 
income below a certain threshold (£90 a week in October 1999) would receive the 
maximum amount of WFTC. This maximum amount varied with the number and ages 
of children in the family. Any increases in net income above this income threshold 
reduced the amount of WFTC at a rate of 55%. So for every extra £1 earned over the 
threshold (after income tax and national insurance) the family would experience a 55 
pence fall in WFTC payments. At some level of net income the family would not be 
eligible for any WFTC. As WFTC was counted as income in the computation of 
Housing Benefit entitlement it was often difficult for a family to assess their final 
income should their circumstances change. 
 
                                              
1  There was some variation in the payment method. Couples could elect for the credit 
to be paid directly to the primary carer in response to concerns about the distribution 
of income within families (the purse versus wallet debate). The self-employed 
received the credit direct from the Inland Revenue. 
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If an adult worked over 30 hours a week a small extra payment was made. Financial 
assets over £3000 reduced the amount of credit and families with savings of over 
£8000 were not eligible for any credit. Families were assessed for WFTC every six 
months, with the onus on the family to inform the Inland Revenue of any changes in 
circumstances. 
 
WFTC was more generous than FC in a number of dimensions. The maximum 
amount of credit was higher, the net income threshold at which a family would be 
fully eligible was higher but perhaps most importantly the rate of credit withdrawal 
was lower at 55% compared to 70% under FC (although taking income tax and 
national insurance into account the implicit tax rate was 69%, Lydon and Walker 
(2005)). From 1994 a disregard was introduced in FC for help with the costs of certain 
forms of childcare but was of no benefit for the poorest families on maximum credit. 
WFTC provided significantly more generous support for childcare. Families could 
claim an additional childcare tax credit of 70% of formal childcare costs up to £100 a 
week for those with one child to £150 a week for those with two or more children (for 
couples both must be working at least 16 hours a week) and this was coupled with 
increases in the disregard for childcare costs for the purposes of calculating 
entitlement to Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
 
In April 2003 the system of WFTC was abolished and replaced with the Working Tax 
Credit (WTC) and the Child Tax Credit (CTC). The receipt of CTC is not dependent 
on employment status and is paid to the primary carer. WTC essentially has the same 
features of WFTC but is more generous still. The credit amounts and income 
thresholds were again increased and the credit withdrawal taper was further reduced 
to 37%. Assets were no longer considered when calculating entitlement and child 
support payments are not taken into account. In addition, the eligibility was extended 
to those 25 years or older on low incomes without dependent children. The period of 
eligibility assessment was increased from the previous six months to the previous tax 
year; which contributed to some of the subsequent problems of over-payment. The 
idea was to align the payment as closely as possible with the tax system and 
responsibility was moved from the Department of Work and Pensions to the Inland 
Revenue (now HMRC).  
 
In the statistical analysis we present below we concentrate on comparing outcomes for 
recipients of WFTC with FC recipients and, therefore, we present findings up to April 
2003. 
 
3. Employment effects of Tax Credits 
There is a growing body of academic research analysing the employment impacts of 
the WFTC. Despite these studies varying in their methodology and time period of 
analysis, the consensus is that the WFTC raised employment among the target groups. 
Most of the work examines the impact on lone parents’ employment, one of the 
biggest beneficiaries of the WFTC, but some studies also examine the impact on 
couples with children.  
 
Lone parent employment grew strongly over the period in which WFTC was 
introduced. However, it had been growing strongly since the UK came out of 
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recession in 1993. The main difficulty in assessing the effect of WFTC is that we do 
not know what would have happened to employment in the target groups in the 
absence of the policy change (the counterfactual). For example, employment may 
have grown strongly among lone parents even if the WFTC had not been introduced. 
The typical way in which researchers attempt to overcome this problem is to pick a 
comparison group (e.g. single adults without children) and calculate any change 
between the two groups. The estimated impact of the policy change is therefore based 
on the assumption that any change in the differential is due to the policy and this may 
not always be true.  
 
The first paper to examine employment effects was by Brewer and Gregg (2001). 
They examined the impact on lone parents’ employment, using single adults without 
children as a comparison group, and found that the WFTC raised the employment rate 
of lone parents by about 1.4 percentage points. However, because they only had 
access to data up to Summer 2000 the statistical robustness of these results was low. 
Gregg and Harkness (2003) also examined lone parents and used the same 
comparison group. They found a larger effect on employment of 5 percentage points 
and also an increase in hours of work among those lone parents in employment. Leigh 
(2004) finds a smaller, albeit positive impact on work among lone parents and women 
in couples of around 1 percentage point. He also reports an increase in hours of work 
of one hour a week. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2004) find a much larger 
positive impact on employment among lone parents of 7 percentage points, driven by 
an increase in flows into employment but also by a decline in flows out of work 
among this group. They also report the biggest impacts among lone parents with a 
child under the age of five years.  
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the WFTC is that of Blundell, Brewer 
and Shepherd (2005). They examine the impact on lone parents’ employment and also 
on couples with children. They point out that because other policies were introduced 
at the same time as the WFTC it is not possible to identify its impact in isolation. The 
most important of these other policies was the increases in child allowances for those 
on Income Support and Job Seekers Allowance. These would have the effect of 
reducing work incentives, particularly for lone parents. They report an increase in 
employment arising from the WFTC among female lone parents of 3.6 percentage 
points, or 60,000 but view this as an under-estimate of the true impact. 
 
The results for couples are somewhat mixed, depending on whether the individual’s 
partner is currently working or not. For men and women without a working partner 
they find a positive impact on employment from the introduction of the WFTC. 
However, for those with a partner already working they find no impact on work, and 
indeed for men with a working partner they report a negative impact on work status. 
This is perhaps not as surprising as it may seem. For individuals with a working 
partner the increased generosity of the WFTC provides an income boost to the 
household that is not contingent on them working. Economic theory predicts that 
some of these individuals would stop working as a result of this income boost. The 
overall effect is a re-distribution of work as individuals in workless households enter 
work and some of those in households with both adults working drop out of work. 
The overall effect of this is a fall in the number of workless households. 
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Brewer, Duncan, Shepherd and Suarez (2006) examine the employment impacts by 
estimating an empirical model of labour supply (a model that tells us how individuals 
and households respond to changes in work incentives) and evaluate the impact of the 
WFTC using this model. They find a positive impact on employment of lone parents 
of about 5 percentage points, a negative impact of about 0.57 percentage points 
among women in couples and a positive impact of 0.75 percentage points among men 
in couples. The reductions in employment among women in couples are driven by 
those with working partners for the reasons given above. They go on to estimate that 
although the total number of jobs increases by about 80,000 the number of workless 
households with children falls by 99,000 due to this redistribution of work. 
 
One of the few studies that has assessed the impact of the WFTC on wage growth 
found that the WFTC has a positive impact on wage growth for individuals who 
became eligible with the introduction of the WFTC (and who were not eligible under 
FC) and were therefore on the taper, but a negative effect for individuals who received 
the maximum payment (Lydon and Walker, 2004). They hypothesise that the positive 
impact could be due to employers using the wage subsidy to fund general training and 
individuals being in the position to accept such jobs paying below their reservation 
wage.  
 
Another piece of research which has looked at within year earnings and income 
variability of WFTC recipients has shown that there is both a considerable amount of 
variability in earnings and many of the income components (including tax credit 
payments) on a month by month basis (Hills, Smithies and McKnight, 2006). While 
the number of families followed on a week by week basis was small, it does provide a 
warning against simply using point in time estimates of earnings and income among 
this low income group and strengthens the case for using annual information.  
 
4. Estimates of the impact of WFTC on job retention and 
advancement – the model 
We want to estimate the impact of tax credits on employment retention and 
advancement. As we do not have experimental data where a random sample of 
qualifying individuals were given tax credits and a random sample of qualifying 
individuals were not given tax credits, we have to use statistical techniques to attempt 
to estimate what individuals’ employment profiles would have been in the absence of 
tax credits (the counterfactual). We therefore have to estimate the counterfactual by 
identifying a number of different control groups and use statistical techniques to 
produce estimates of how tax credit recipients would have fared in the absence of tax 
credits. The main statistical method we employ is the Difference-in-Differences (Diff-
in-Diffs) estimator. This estimator is often used to assess the impact of a treatment on 
an outcome variable in the absence of experimental data. In simple terms, the 
difference in the outcome between treatment and control groups before the treatment, 
is compared to the difference in the outcome between the same groups after the 
treatment. For example, the impact of an active labour market programme designed to 
move welfare recipients off benefit and into work can be assessed by comparing the 
outflow from the stock of claimants before and after the introduction of the 
programme compared with a group of claimants who were not eligible for the 
programme. From this simple example it is fairly obvious that the basic assumption 
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underlying the Diff-in-Diffs estimator is that apart from the introduction of the 
treatment nothing else changed which had an unequal impact on the outcome variable 
for the treatment and control groups. This is often not the case and some attempt to 
control for other changes can be made by estimating the Diff-in-Diffs estimator in a 
multiple regression framework.  
 
More formally, abstracting from other regressors, the Diff-in-Diffs estimator is 
defined as: 
 ( ) ( )CtTtCtTtDID YYYY 0011ˆ −−−=δ , 
 
where Y T and Y C are the mean outcomes for the treatment and control groups, 
respectively, and t0 and t1 indicate time before and after the introduction of the 
treatment respectively. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis the outcome variables of interest are the probability 
of remaining in work and wage progression rates. Comparisons will be made between 
individuals who move off out of work benefit into work and receive in work benefits 
and those who do not receive in work benefits. We define the treatment as the 
introduction of WFTC in 1999. We estimate a number of different models including 
controls for age and entry wage position. 
 
5. Data 
The data used in this paper is the Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB). For a 
fuller description, see CASEpaper 132. The LLMDB comprises of a large number of 
administrative data series that can be linked together. These data are derived from a 
1% random sample of individuals drawn from National Insurance records for each tax 
year from 1978/79 to 2004/05. The database contains information on annual earnings 
from employment and spells of self employment and benefits receipt. Information is 
also held on date of birth, sex, postcode of home address, date of death (where 
applicable) and whether the individual is a migrant. We can build a unique picture of 
individuals following them through spells of employment, self employment, and 
benefit receipt over a substantial portion of their working lives.  
 
We have constructed a panel dataset that contains as much information as possible on 
individuals’ labour market status and earnings for each tax year from 1978/79 to 
2004/05. It dataset contains information on an individual’s annual earnings for each 
tax year, whether they are self employed and whether they are in receipt of 
contributory benefits. However, within any given tax year, precisely when an 
individual is in any given state is unknown. 
 
To these data we have supplemented information on in work benefits; Family Credit 
and Working Families Tax Credit. We only have information on the receipt of these 
benefits from 1994/95 tax year. This limits our analysis somewhat but we still have a 
number of years to analyse FC and WFTC separately. For FC and WFTC we actually 
have the start and end dates of the spells on these benefits (rather than number of 
weeks in the year claimed as with the other benefits). This enables us to look more 
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precisely at spell lengths on these in-work benefits and to see if there are any 
differences between the two. In addition, we also observe multiple spells on these 
benefits, so we can analyse those individuals that cycle on and off FC and WFTC.  
 
6. The Results 
(a) Summary figures on Family Credit and Working Families Tax Credit 
As our data comprises of a 1% random sample of the population of Great Britain, as 
such it should provide an unbiased sample of those claiming FC and WFTC. In 
addition, we should be able to gross up to population figures by multiplying our 
sample numbers by 100 (since we observe 1 in every 100 in the population). To begin 
with we provide an analysis of the number of individuals claiming FC and WFTC, 
and some of their characteristics, and compare these to the official statistics published 
by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  
 
Figure 1 presents the official caseloads for FC and WFTC for all claimants, couples 
and lone parents between 1988 and 2002. There has been a clear growth in the receipt 
of in-work benefits in Britain over this time period. In 1988 there were roughly 
250,000 individuals claiming FC, most of these were individuals in couple 
households. Through the early 1990s the prevalence of FC grew so that by 1999 when 
it was replaced with WFTC there were some 800,000 individuals claiming. The 
introduction of WFTC brought a huge expansion in the number of claimants. By 2002 
around 1.2 million individuals were claiming WFTC. This growth has occurred 
amongst both couples and lone parents. 
 
Figure 2 presents our figures on receipt of FC and WFTC for the period 1995 – 2004. 
These figures look very similar to those in Figure 1 from the official caseload. This 
figure also reports the number of men and women claiming separately. Women make 
up about 60-70% of recipients. Note that our figures relate to those claiming WFTC 
and in work. So for a couple claiming we will observe the recipient in work for the 
purposes of the benefit.  
 
Table 1 then presents the age composition of those receiving in-work benefits. The 
majority of recipients are between the ages of 25 and 50. However, there is some 
evidence that the age composition has shifted over time. There appears to be fewer 
younger recipients and a shift towards somewhat older recipients in the last few years. 
 
Table 2 presents information on the family type of the recipient and who is the main 
earner in the household. These figures come from published statistics rather than our 
data since we do not observe household information. Most recipients are employees 
rather than self employed, but the proportion of self employed recipients roughly 
reflects the proportion in the workforce as a whole. Among claimants living in 
couples, the majority are in families where the man is the main earner. However, since 
most lone parents are women, they are the largest group of recipients overall.  
 
Figure 3 then presents the average value of the award in nominal weekly terms. This 
trended upwards through the period of Family Credit. However, since the introduction 
of WFTC the average award has become more generous. Overall the money allocated 
to WFTC was much more than FC. These figures tell us that some of this extra cash 
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went to the increased caseloads, and some on the increased generosity of each claim. 
These changes may well have important impacts on employment retention and 
advancement for in-work benefit recipients. 
 
(b) The duration of FC and WFTC claims 
We now turn to examine the duration of spells on FC and WFTC. Table 3 presents 
information on the length of spells on in-work benefits. This shows us that the spell 
length is quite widely distributed across recipients. About 40% of all claims are 
between 6 and 12 months. However, more than 30% of claims last more than two 
years. So while the average duration of a spell is about 20 months, this varies widely 
between different claimants, with some having only short spells on in-work benefits 
and some having very long spells. Tables 4 and 5 present these distributions for men 
and women respectively. We can see that in-work benefit claims for women tend to 
last quite a bit longer than for men. In particular, there are significantly more women 
with spells lasting more than 36 months and the gap appears to be widening. 
 
However, just looking at single spell durations may not tell us the whole story. It 
might well be that in-work benefit claimants are cycling on and off these benefits so 
that within a short time of a spell ending another one begins. Table 6 shows there is 
some truth in this. While about 40% of those ending a claim do not have another one 
(at least in the period of our data), about 15-20% will start a new claim within 3 
months and some 30-40% start a new claim within the next year. This suggests quite a 
high degree of repeat claims of in-work benefits and is somewhat worrying for those 
who would hope that in-work benefits provide a step up into better paid jobs. There 
do not appear to be any clear differences between the extent of repeat claims for FC 
and WFTC claimants. Tables 7 and 8 present the same information for men and 
women to examine if the incidence of repeat spells is different for the sexes. The 
results show a very similar pattern for men and women.  
 
(c) Transitions into work 
We have established that spells on FC and WFTC can last some time and furthermore 
many of those who do stop claiming will start a new claim within a short space of 
time. We now turn to look at transitions in more detail to see how effective in-work 
benefits are at helping job entrants to remain in employment. In particular, we shall 
examine differences in the effectiveness of WFTC compared to FC in terms of 
employment retention of new entrants. In order to do this we have to use our data in a 
slightly different way than we have so far. We create annual (tax year) records of 
employment for individuals and follow them over time. This allows us to examine 
those who are moving from non-employment into employment from one year to the 
next. We then want to examine what happens to these job entrants the following year, 
i.e. whether they are still in employment or not. Specifically we want to compare 
those who enter employment and claim in-work benefits with those who enter work 
independently of in-work benefits and how this changes pre and post WFTC. The 
diagram below shows the sequence of transitions we are looking at. We take all those 
who are out of work in year t – 1, who then enter work in year t. Here they can either 
enter work on WFTC or not. We then compare outcomes in terms of whether these 
entrants are in employment in year t + 1. This is expressed as a percent of the original 
group of entrants who are still in employment.  
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State at t-1 State at t State at t+1 
Non-employed 
Employed – FC/WFTC 
Employed? 
Employed – No FC/WFTC 
 
In terms of our difference-in-difference estimation described above we basically 
compare this employment probability for our in-work benefits entrants before and 
after WFTC introduction and for our non in–work benefits entrants before and after 
WFTC.  Here our treatment group is those entering on in work benefits and our 
control group those entering but not on these benefits. Before we proceed to the 
estimation results let us look at some descriptives on these transitions.  
 
Figure 4 presents the percent of those in non-employment in year t-1 who enter work 
in year t (note that this includes both employment and self employment). Around 13-
15% of non-employed men and women enter work by the following tax year. This 
varies a little over the economic cycle. Figure 5 then presents the percent of these 
entrants who do so into Family Credit or WFTC. Roughly 5% of women entering 
work do so on FC and WFTC. The figure for men is higher at about 8% and this has 
risen since the introduction of WFTC to about 10%. It is possible that more men are 
entering work on WFTC because of its increased generosity over FC and therefore 
men now qualify for in-work benefits. It is this group of entrants that we want to 
compare with general job entrants to see if there is any difference in their subsequent 
employment retention rates. 
 
7. The impact of WFTC on employment retention  
We now turn to look at the issue of whether WFTC has led to greater employment 
retention than FC. For this we will use our difference-in-difference estimation 
technique outlined above. In fact, we will use a regression adjusted version of this. To 
begin with it is informative to just look at the retention rates over time for those 
entering work on in-work benefits and those entering without these benefits. Figure 6 
shows the percent of these entrants who remain in employment at year t+1 and Figure 
7 for year t+2. We can see that employment retention is higher for those on in-work 
benefits. Over 85% of these FC/WFTC entrants remain in employment whereas 
retention rates are a few percent points lower for other entrants. But the striking thing 
to note about this figure is that the retention rate appears to have risen after 1999 
when WFTC was introduced. This first piece of tentative evidence suggests that 
employment retention may have risen with the introduction of WFTC. 
 
In order to establish how significant this apparent change in retention is we turn to our 
statistical model of difference-in-differences. This essentially compares retention rates 
in the periods before and after WFTC introduction for our FC/WFTC group and for 
the non-FC/WFTC group. This estimation allows us to test whether there is a 
statistical difference between these two groups in terms of the change in the retention 
rates. It also enables us to control for other factors that may be affecting the retention 
rates, such as age differences and even the entry wage.  
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Table 9 presents the results of this estimation. The results are the estimated percent 
point change in the employment retention rate as a result of the introduction of 
WFTC. When estimating such models we need to make an assessment as to whether 
we have estimated a statistically significant result or not. Economists usually work 
with degrees of significance. We signify whether there is an apparent impact of 
WFTC using this convention.2 Our results suggest a positive impact on retention from 
the WFTC for all entrants but this relationship is not quite statistically significant. 
When we estimate separately for males and females, we find no effect for females but 
a statistically significant impact for males. The results suggest that the WFTC 
increased the employment retention rate for males by about 2% points. 
 
Adding in controls for age does not change the results very much. However, when we 
add the wage at entry as a control the effects become even larger and have greater 
statistical significance. This specification is essentially comparing job entrants of the 
same age and same entry wage into FC/WFTC with those not on FC/WFTC. It allows 
us to control for changes in the characteristics of the treatment and control groups in 
terms of entry wages. As WFTC was more generous than FC, and therefore covers 
higher wage individuals, and we know that there is a positive relationship between 
employment retention and position in the earnings distribution, it is possible that 
employment retention estimates excluding controls for entry wage could overestimate 
the impact of WFTC 
 
The results are quite striking. The WFTC appears to have increased job retention for 
males at least. It might be that we can also see this effect in terms of weeks worked in 
the year, rather than just employment spells. Table 10 estimates the impact of WFTC 
on weeks worked. None of the estimated impacts are large and they are all statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Finally we turn to wages. One hope has been that getting people into work will lead 
them to make progress on the jobs ladder into better paying jobs. Here we look to see 
if the WFTC has resulted in greater wage growth. Figure 8 shows the percentage 
change in wages for job entrants one year after they entered work. This figure shows 
that, on average, wage growth is the same for in-work benefit recipients and non-
recipients except in 1998 and 1999 when wage growth was higher for non-recipients. 
Table 11 reports the estimates from the diff-in-diffs model on the impact of WFTC on 
wage growth the year after job entry. Again the estimated effects are small and not 
statistically significant.  
 
8. Summary and conclusion 
Under Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997 there were growing twin 
problems of work poor households and increasing child poverty rates. When Labour 
came to power in 1997 they quickly introduced a raft of active labour market policies 
                                              
2  The convention is to look for relationships that can be said to meet statistical 
significance at the 5% level. In table 9 we report * for 10% significance level, ** for 
5% significance level, and *** for 1% significance level. The latter is the most 
stringent criteria.   
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designed to increase transitions from welfare to work and to increase the earnings and 
household incomes and the most disadvantaged in the labour market. 
 
In this chapter we have focused on the Working Families Tax Credit which was 
introduced in 1999. This tax credit supplemented the wages of low paid workers 
living in low income families. WFTC was more generous than its predecessors 
(FIS/FC) and eligibility was increased through increasing the maximum earnings 
threshold and reducing the rate at which the credit was withdrawn. The objectives of 
the WFTC were to increase employment among the most disadvantaged workers by 
increasing the financial gains from working even in very low paid jobs, improving job 
retention by either making it possible for individuals to remain in very low paid jobs 
or, more optimistically, to use this first job as a stepping stone to better paid jobs. In 
addition, WFTC was designed to increase household incomes amongst this 
disadvantaged group where child poverty is particularly concentrated. 
 
The LLMDB provides a unique opportunity to track a large random sample of 
individuals between employment states, moves on and off in-work benefits coupled 
with a complete record of annual earnings. 
 
The introduction of WFTC resulted in a large increase in the number of individuals 
receiving in-work benefits and an increase in the average value of these awards. The 
LLMDB does not allow us to estimate the impact of WFTC in terms of increased 
flows into employment but other research has shown that WFTC increased 
employment particularly for some groups such as lone parents. We focus our analysis 
on assessing the impact of WFTC on employment retention and wage progression.  
 
We find evidence that the WFTC increased employment retention among male 
recipients relative to retention rates observed among male Family Credit recipients. 
We find no evidence that WFTC improved wage progression, in terms of annual 
earnings growth in the first year after the start of a claim, relative to FC. But 
importantly there is no evidence that the more generous WFTC was being used by 
employers to keep wage growth down. This may or may not have been helped by the 
simultaneous introduction of the National Minimum Wage which placed a wage floor 
in the low wage labour market. 
 
Overall the evidence suggests the evidence suggests that WFTC benefited a larger 
number of low wage families with higher average awards and improved employment 
retention among male recipients without a detrimental impact on wage growth. The 
findings suggest that alternative policies are required to improve job progression; a 
job is a step in the right direction but is not an automatic leg-up onto a jobs ladder. 
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Figure 1: Official Number of Claimants FC and WFTC
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Figure 2: Estimated claimants from LLMDB
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Figure 3: Average Value of Award FC and WFTC
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Figure 4: Job entrants
% entering employment from non-employment
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Figure 5: FC and WFTC entrants
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Figure 6: Employment Retention and In-Work Benefits
 % of entrants in employment in year t + 1
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Figure 7: Employment Retention and In-Work Benefits
 % of entrants in employment in year t + 2
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Figure 8: Wage growth and In-Work Benefits
 % wage change for new job entrants
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Source: WFTC and FC Quarterly Enquiry, UK WFTC recipients (thousands), November 
2002 
Age Group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
   <20 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.79 0.73 0.59 0.7 0.64 0.51 0.58
 20-24 8.3 7.37 7.38 6.84 7.22 6.57 6.26 6.82 6.86 6.92
 25-29 13.87 13.93 14.18 13.15 12.58 12.34 11.27 10.55 9.76 10.02 
 30-34 28.86 28.63 28.48 28.71 28.08 27.75 27.87 27.27 25.65 21.6
 35-39 22.95 23.34 23.15 23.45 23.91 24.87 24.73 25.16 25.64 22.2
 40-44 14.56 15.42 14.96 15.9 16.14 16.5 17.24 18.07 18.68 19.18 
 45-49 7.45 7.41 7.71 7.08 7.35 7.33 8.05 7.67 8.86 10.67 
 50-54 2.57 2.42 2.7 3.04 2.69 2.85 2.82 2.86 2.87 5.23
 55-59 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.9 1.06 0.98 0.85 0.81 0.95 3.02
   60+ 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.24 0.57
Table 1: The age profile of in-work benefit claimants
 Percent of claimants in different age categories
All Employees Self Employed
All cases 1,376.3 1,245.5 130.8 
Couples 639.0 542.6 96.4 
Male main earner 514.7 427.7 87.0 
Female main earner 124.3 114.8 9.5
Lone parents 737.3 702.9 34.3 
Male 30.7 25.2 5.5
Female 706.6 677.8 28.8 
Table 2: Recipients by Family Type and Main Earner 
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1995 1997 1999 2001
    <3 months 0 0.14 0.19 0.07
   3-6 months 0 0 0.13 0.25
  6-12 months 38.01 43.17 36.9 36.02
 12-18 months 16.91 17.95 15.75 19.52
 18-24 months 10.81 9.66 8.89 12.78
 24-36 months 12.18 11.06 12.1 11.83
   36+ months 22.1 18.02 26.05 19.52
Table 5: Duration of FC and WFTC claims - Females
% in different duration categories
1995 1997 1999 2001
    <3 months 0.01 0.16 0.12 0.27
   3-6 months 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.35
  6-12 months 40.85 46.08 39.96 40.09
 12-18 months 17.03 18.29 15.37 19.6
 18-24 months 10.37 9.24 8.99 14.06
 24-36 months 11.63 10.41 11.9 11.23
   36+ months 20.06 15.79 23.52 14.4
Table 3: Duration of FC and WFTC claims
% in different duration categories
1995 1997 1999 2001
    <3 months 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.51
   3-6 months 0.1 0.09 0.15 0.48
  6-12 months 44.41 49.86 44.34 45.33
 12-18 months 17.19 18.74 14.83 19.7
 18-24 months 9.83 8.68 9.12 15.72
 24-36 months 10.94 9.55 11.62 10.46
   36+ months 17.49 12.89 19.9 7.81
Table 4: Duration of FC and WFTC claims - Males
% in different duration categories
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1995 1997 1999 2001
No spell 40.48 39.55 38.46 47.81
<1 month 6.01 6.65 9.24 10.3
1-3 months 7.49 8.29 9.26 10.68
3-6 months 7.59 7.89 8.02 7.4
6-12 months 11.69 10.65 12.64 10.34
12-18 months 5.71 5.32 5.81 5.14
18-24 months 3.53 3.6 4.08 3.49
24-36 months 4.66 6.88 4.78 3.18
36-48 months 3 3.96 3.78 1.62
>48 months 9.84 7.21 3.94 0.03
Table 6: Repeat Spells of In-Work Benefits 
% of those ending a spell who start new spell
1995 1997 1999 2001
No spell 39.08 39.23 38.94 51.9
<1 month 6.94 7.22 8.46 10.5
1-3 months 8.02 8.87 9.98 9.6
3-6 months 8.88 7.45 8.37 7.6
6-12 months 11.88 11.07 14.04 10.01
12-18 months 6.01 4.94 6.46 4.59
18-24 months 3.79 3.61 4.16 2.56
24-36 months 4.51 6.86 4.65 2.24
36-48 months 1.79 4.66 2.59 1 
>48 months 9.09 6.08 2.35 0 
Table 7: Repeat Spells of In-Work Benefits - Males 
% of those ending a spell who start new spell
1995 1997 1999 2001
No spell 41.67 39.81 38.12 44.14
<1 month 5.21 6.17 9.79 10.13
1-3 months 7.05 7.8 8.76 11.65
3-6 months 6.5 8.26 7.77 7.22
6-12 months 11.52 10.3 11.66 10.63
12-18 months 5.45 5.64 5.35 5.64
18-24 months 3.31 3.6 4.02 4.34
24-36 months 4.78 6.89 4.88 4.03
36-48 months 4.04 3.37 4.6 2.17
>48 months 10.48 8.14 5.05 0.06
Table 8: Repeat Spells of In-Work Benefits - Females 
% of those ending a spell who start new spell
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Males Females
Basic model no 
controls 1.48% 2.07% * 0.23%
Controls for Age 1.28% 2.03% * 0.25%
Controls for age 
and entry wage 2.81% *** 3.05% *** 1.98%
Table 9: Impact of WFTC on employment retention
% point change in retention rate due to WFTC
All Males Females
Controls 
for age -0.91% 0.38% -3.94% 
Table 10: Impact of WFTC on weeks worked
% point change in weeks worked due to WFTC
All Males Females
Controls 
for age 0.63% 0.72% -0.69% 
Table 11: Impact of WFTC on weekly pay
% point change in weekly pay worked due to WFTC
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